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Abstract 
 
The UK is presently engaged in a process of leaving the EU.  This 
process, and its broader effect on UK and EU law and governance, is 
complex and uncertain.  This analysis hones in on the sphere of climate 
and energy governance, investigating the EU's supranational regime in 
order to elucidate fundamental aspects of the UK's withdrawal from the 
EU for the UK Low Carbon Transition in the sphere of energy 
decarbonisation.  The analysis focuses most pointedly on the EU arena, 
rather than the UK's internal state arena, and elucidates aspects of the 
impact of Brexit on the UK through examination of the EU-UK legal and 
political interface.  This permits lessons to be drawn that can usefully 
inform broader assessments of the significance of Brexit's impact on the 
UK's ongoing climate and energy decarbonisation process.  
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
On Thursday 23rd of June 2016 the UK voted by way of Referendum to 
leave the EU, with a Leave majority being returned by 52% against a 48% 
Remain minority. [1] As such, the UK has since been on a trajectory to 
leave the EU. UK Government employed its facility to invoke Article 50 of 
the Treaty on European Union on Wednesday 29th of March 2017, setting 
in motion a two-year EU withdrawal period.  In accordance with Article 50, 
it is intended that a withdrawal agreement between the UK and the EU is 
to be negotiated and reached by the end of this time.  The UK's notification 
of withdrawal was preceded by a UK Supreme Court ruling that held that 
UK Parliament was to be consulted before Article 50 could be triggered 
by UK Government, [2] and Parliament consequently passed a European 
Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Act 2017 to permit the action. [3]   As 
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part of the exiting process, it is necessary for the UK to repeal the 
European Communities Act 1972, which gives effect to EU law in the UK.  
In late 2016, Pincott, Emmett and Jones noted that: 
 
[g]iven the volume of [UK] legislation affected [by withdrawal from 
the EU], the government is considering a Great Repeal Bill to 
grandfather existing regulatory regimes, retaining EU legislation 
which could then be amended or repealed as appropriate at a later 
date. [4] 
 
It has since been confirmed that the government will follow this approach, 
with a Great Repeal Bill being brought forward under the official title of the 
European Union (Withdrawal) Bill 2017-2019. This is intended to both 
repeal the European Communities Act 1972 and convert extant EU law 
into UK law, such that EU law will be received immediately into the UK 
legal order on the moment that Brexit is complete. [5]   After the point at 
which the UK has left the EU, it is intended that UK Parliament and, where 
appropriate, the UK's devolved Parliaments can take decisions on which 
laws to keep, amend or repeal over time.  It is also intended that UK 
Government itself will play a direct role in this process of legal 
readjustment, which (it is proposed at the time of writing) will be authorised 
under the terms of the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill 2017-2019 
through the use of controversial delegated powers designed to facilitate 
the creation of secondary legislation. [6]   
 
The impact of the process of leaving the EU on UK (and indeed EU) law 
and governance will be complex and pervasive. [7]   This analysis focuses 
on one of the most challenging political-legal spheres, climate and energy 
governance, in order to elucidate fundamental elements of the 
implications of the UK's withdrawal from the EU for aspects of UK energy 
decarbonisation.  Reference will be made at various stages to the 
methods and tools of political science in order to enrich the unfolding 
critique, most particularly multilevel governance theory.  Multilevel 
governance conceptualises a series of 'levels' of governance, including 
an EU level and a national (here, 'UK') level.  Multilevel governance 
theorists are concerned with the behavior, influence and changing 
relationships between key public and private actors ranging across and 
between these conceptual levels, and the multifarious policy networks that 
enmesh them.  Institutional entanglement can be discerned across the 
levels, and the theory seeks to identify and throw into relief both 'vertical' 
and 'horizontal' instances of governmental and other sources of action and 
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interaction. [8]   Reference will also be made to more conventionally 'state-
centric' interpretations of EU integration, which tend towards 
understanding power as being most essentially concentrated in the hands 
of the Member State governments and associated national actors, [9] 
rather than significantly dispersed away to at least some strong degree to 
broader supranational (and subnational) actors as a consequence of the 
EU's wider governance regimes. 
 
The EU 'level' occupies the primary site of focus in this study, with the 
national UK level occupying the subsidiary level of analysis; a central 
interest is to investigate climate and energy law and governance in the 
EU's supranational sphere in order to rationalise the balance of climate 
and energy power in the UK's EU governance setting.  In clarifying and 
exploring these supranational imperatives, it is possible to draw lessons 
that provide a richer understanding of the implications of Brexit for UK 
climate and energy governance.  The following analysis will: commence 
by addressing the importance and centrality of energy decarbonisation in 
the context of UK and EU climate governance; proceed to engage with 
the drivers of EU energy decarbonisation, and reflect on the bearing those 
drivers have on the UK governance experience; engage with EU climate 
law and policy in conjunction with consideration of pertinent supranational 
Treaty developments, thereby exposing and addressing crucial EU forces 
acting on Member States in this area so that the 'national' UK 
decarbonisation experience can be better informed by the (supra)national 
causal effect of EU climate governance, thus feeding into interpretations 
of the impact of Brexit.  
 
 
 
2. THE IMPORTANCE OF ENERGY DECARBONISATION 
IN THE UK AND EU 
 
A UK Low Carbon Transition is ongoing, [10] and within this process, 
significant decarbonisation of the energy sector has become a paramount 
national objective. [11]   UK Parliament has set in place a major national 
statute that articulates the foundational framework of the UK's low carbon 
governance architecture, the Climate Change Act 2008 ('CCA 
2008').  Certainly, adequate decarbonisation of the UK energy sector is 
essential if the requirements of the CCA 2008 are to be met.  The CCA 
2008 commits the UK as a whole to a 34% reduction in greenhouse gas 
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emissions based on 1990 baseline emissions levels by 2020 (this is 
known as the 'interim target'). [12]   It also applies an 80% reduction target 
based on 1990 levels for 2050, [13] establishes a Committee on Climate 
Change to report and advise on the reductions process, [14] and facilitates 
greenhouse gas emissions trading schemes. [15]   
 
The overall transition process is concerned with a specific 'basket' of 
greenhouse gases, listed in national law at s.24 of the CCA 2008. [16]   In 
critiquing the CCA 2008 in order to assess the extent to which the 
national-level legal framework has taken account of the UK's multilevel 
governance environment, I have noted that '[t]he CCA 2008 is in effect the 
partial implementation answer to the substantial targets and legislative 
goals that have been developing in this area at the EU/supranational 
level.' [17]   In other words, the CCA 2008 and associated UK law and 
policy partially embody a national-level reaction to important policy 
intentions and legislative goals crystallising at the supranational level 
within the UK's broader 'supranational-national-subnational' multilevel 
governance setting. 
 
Against the backdrop of the interconnected landscape of UK-EU law, it 
should be understood that the EU's supranational institutions are, 
generally speaking, as eager (if not more eager) to strive toward a Low 
Carbon Transition as the UK's major state-level governance actors are 
(UK Government, national Parliament).  Within the last ten years or so EU 
law and UK law have both come together to impose fairly rigorous 
greenhouse gas emission reduction targets upon the UK. [18]   The UK's 
largest greenhouse gas-emitting sector is the energy sector; mirroring the 
national UK experience, this is also the EU's largest emitting sector. 
[19]   Indeed, in stressing in 2010 that EU energy policy takes overt 
account of broadly construed 'energy related emissions', the European 
Commission declared that these emissions alone 'account for almost 80% 
of the EU's total greenhouse gas emissions', [20] meaning that the 'energy 
challenge is thus one of the greatest tests which Europe has to face.' 
[21]   This statement from the Commission characterises some discernible 
spirit of urgency that has underpinned the EU energy emissions reduction 
process.  
 
Indeed, the energy sector produces such a high and sustained proportion 
of UK/EU emissions that it would be difficult to see how either the UK or 
the EU could meet substantial reduction targets if the energy sector 
performed poorly in the overall reductions drive even if other major sectors 
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performed reasonably well. In the present context, the 'multi-level' aspect 
of multilevel governance theory provides a conceptual evocation of 
vertical and horizontal institutions, actions and forces that underpin UK-
EU climate and energy governance processes [22] ; given that the 
'national' concerns here in the sphere of energy echo precisely the same 
sorts of anxieties at the EU level, multilevel governance theory suggests 
not merely that these concerns are in some sense harmonious, but, more 
than this, that they are also to a significant extent mutually reinforcing 
across complex tiers of governance. 
 
'Emissions Share by Sector in EU28, 2014' 
Source: Europa, 'Data Viewer' [23] 
 
It is also worth pointing out that 'energy' (that is, electricity and heat 
generation) is remarkably pervasive: for example, in the present context 
energy emissions from power generation can be seen to implicate a broad 
process that involves not only the power stations that generate the energy, 
but also those sectors of society that consume the stations' energy (i.e., 
the domestic sector, industrial sector, etc.).  Strictly speaking, power 
generation emissions cannot be fundamentally separated out from 
sectors that consume the power, due to the pervasive qualities of energy 
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itself. Bearing this in mind, it is notable that it is considered pertinent to, 
and 'compatible' with, multilevel governance theory [24] to recognise that 
it has been demonstrated by political scientists that supranational-national 
relations can be viewed as operating within an EU governance 
architecture that constitutes a classic example of a 'differentiated polity'. 
[25]   
 
A differentiated polity model located within the EU multilevel governance 
nexus assumes that the formation of political-legal outcomes is radically 
impacted by often distinctive and significantly disconnected policy 
networks that are informed to a pronounced extent in their own right by 
complicated and labyrinthine committees and associated bodies that 
shape policy options. [26]  Peterson has commented that the 'multi-level 
system of governance' includes a spectrum of actors that 'thus "network" 
with each other to design, implement, and enforce EU rules.' [27]   Given 
that multilevel governance theory interprets supranational-national energy 
governance processes as playing out within this sort of context, where this 
perspective is applied in the present case there can be little doubt based 
on the observable legal evidence that energy reforms at Treaty level over 
recent years have necessarily expanded and deepened the complex 
reach and range of this differentiated polity (see further below). This 
circumstance is augmented not only by the 'usual' sort of evolution 
whereby a discrete area of governance (here, energy) is expanded and 
developed in complex and labyrinthine ways across a broader range 
within the supranational-national governance nexus; it is further 
augmented by the pervasive nature of energy itself. 
 
 
3. MULTI-LEVEL EU POLICY DRIVERS 
 
While the preceding section has addressed the importance of energy 
decarbonisation to climate governance at the UK and EU levels of the 
multilevel governance nexus, this section is concerned to identify and 
interpret the key multi-level drivers present at the EU/supranational level 
of governance that have served to galvanise contemporary EU energy 
decarbonisation law and policy.  In doing so, these drivers have resulted 
in imperatives that have filtered 'downward' to the national UK, [28] and 
that have also served to some extent to echo and reinforce extant UK-
level political-legal drivers. 
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3.1 CLIMATE CHANGE 
 
In the latter half of the 20th century and onward up to the present moment, 
an overwhelming majority of the international scientific community 
gradually came to agree, via a process of evidence-based reason, that: 
the earth is being acted upon in a far-reaching way by the phenomenon 
of global warming; and humanity is actively affecting this global warming 
process to a significant degree. [29]   Climate law is the branch of the law 
that endeavors to engage directly with anthropogenic climate change and 
associated problems. [30]   Anthropogenic climate change is caused 
chiefly by a stock of greenhouse gases present in the earth's atmosphere 
that traps some of the sun's heat, serving to warm the planet.  The modern 
industrial revolution has been driven by a radical increase in the burning 
of fossil fuels, which in turn has raised the density of this atmospheric 
stock.  Scientists have directly linked the anthropogenic ('human-
induced') increase in the stock to a greater incidence of global warming. 
[31] 
 
After China and the USA, the EU is the largest emitter of greenhouse 
gases in the world, and the European Commission has described the EU 
as 'the world's second largest energy market'. [32]   The profound dangers 
that global warming poses both to mankind specifically and to the wider 
functioning of planet earth are well articulated in expert reports from the 
IPCC and broadly accessible books such as Six Degrees [33] and the No-
Nonsense Guide to Climate Change. [34]   Pittock has acknowledged the 
imperative of taking action with reference to the theoretical levels of risk 
and uncertainty posed by the problem. [35]   These sorts of accounts 
exemplify the dual character of the general EU (and international) 
consensus on climate change, which suffuses governance relationships 
operating vertically and horizontally across the multilevel governance 
nexus: firstly, that a situation exists that exhibits the potential to become 
extremely dangerous; and secondly, that pronounced action is required to 
redress the issue at the present time before it reaches a tipping point and 
spirals out of control.   
 
The EU has endeavoured to respond to these sorts of concerns by taking 
internal political action. [36]   It has also acknowledged both its role as a 
major emitter and the existence of an ethical imperative that obligates it 
to take significant steps in order to counteract the problem that it has 
contributed to. [37]   This action in turn has directly impacted on the UK, 
as both a major EU emitter and as a state that has been subject vertically 
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and horizontally to the EU's interactive governance forces across the 
duration of this process since being enmeshed directly in the EU's 
multilevel framework as a Member State (in 1973). 
 
3.2 ENERGY SECURITY AND AFFORDABILITY 
 
An inter-related and important EU governance driver pertains to the issue 
of energy security.  As an advanced, affluent economy the EU has a high 
energy demand, and to produce this energy it relies heavily upon fossil 
fuels.  The EU has highlighted that 'fossil fuels continue to be the major 
contributor to net electricity production in the EU-28' [38] ; with coal, oil 
and natural gas accounting for a substantial level of the EU's primary 
energy generation capacity, fossil fuels remain vital to the EU's stability 
and functionality.  These fuels, however, are not only abundant sources 
of greenhouse gas emissions; they are also finite, and associated 
complex fluctuations in cost can attach to these energy forms.  Their non-
renewable status means that the earth's supplies are gradually becoming 
depleted.  As resources diminish competition over these key sources of 
energy escalates, and a tendency towards a rise in costs that can be 
naturally generated by such circumstances interacts with other cost 
fluctuations associated with complex and frequently unpredictable fuel 
markets, posing challenges for EU energy security and affordability.  The 
EU's level of energy security is therefore significantly threatened by the 
finite condition of the fossil fuels that it employs in over half of its energy 
production. [39]   One way around this problem is to transition away from 
these energy sources towards 'renewable' sources of energy. 
 
A further pressing concern relating to energy security (and which also has 
a capacity to negatively impact affordability) pertains to energy 
importation.  This includes the sourcing and transit of fossil fuel sources: 
the extent to which the EU imports fossil fuel constitutes one of the EU's 
major energy challenges. The European Commission has declared not 
only that the 'European energy market is the world's largest regional 
market (over 500 million consumers)', but that it is the world's 'largest 
energy importer.' [40] The EU presently imports some 50% of its oil and 
gas, meaning that it is reliant upon source nations to ensure that it 
receives vast amounts of its essential energy generation materials.  This 
places the EU in an undesirable position of dependence, for it relies upon 
a given supply nation both to be amenable to conducting trade and to 
price fuels affordably and fairly over the course of that trade.  Further, the 
EU also depends upon source nations to remain in a relatively indefinite 
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condition of socio-political stability so that necessary trade relationships 
can be maintained over time. 
 
 
 
EU energy dependency rate and net imports by country, 2012 [41] 
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Systems of transit also need to remain reliable in order to ensure that 
energy resources can reach their desired destination. Aspects of transit 
can prove to be particularly unpredictable, for energy materials will often 
pass through a variety of countries on route to their destination state, and 
the possibility therefore exists for the transit process to be interrupted or 
broken by various complications. [42]   These realities highlight what the 
European Commission has described as a 'need for diversification of 
energy sources'. [43]   Greater diversification takes some pressure off in 
instances where one avenue of energy supply may become constricted or 
suddenly closed off.  
 
EU climate governance, then, is motivated in particular by several primary 
forces: one force relates to the EU's desire to redress problems posed by 
greenhouse gas emissions and associated anthropogenic climate 
change, and another set of forces relates to a desire to achieve greater 
energy security and affordability.  These general concerns around 
sustainability, security and equity (accessibility, affordability) are often 
conceptually summarized as amounting to an 'energy trilemma'. 
  
  
 
 
EU imports of oil by country of origin (Mt) [44] 
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EU imports of natural gas by country of origin (PJ) [45] 
 
3.3 BROADER DRIVERS: MULTI-LEVEL INFLUENCE OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL ARENA 
 
EU drivers in this sphere have also been subject to profound international-
level influence, which in turn has suffused 'downward' through the 
multilevel governance framework to the UK and other Member 
States.  The international/supranational level interface as a law and 
governance driver determinant poses a slightly differing degree of 
analytical conceptual complexity in the context of multilevel governance 
theory than that engaged by the more purely 'internal' EU drivers treated 
above (climate change; issues around fuel and materials, sourcing, transit 
and cost) insofar as the international arena embodies a broader, complex 
governance vista in its own right.  Although analysis of EU activity at the 
supranational-international level interface often involves the EU being 
conceptualised as a cumulative 'EU' composite that is acting alongside 
conventional nation states on the international stage, whereby it is 
construed frequently as one singular player on that stage (i.e., with the UK 
and other Member States embedded within it), multilevel governance 
theory asserts that this radically oversimplifies the form and nature of the 
EU. [46] 
 
Liberal Intergovernmentalist and other traditional 'state-centric' 
approaches to analysis of the EU suggest that internal EU Member State 
political-legal activity in the sphere of climate and energy governance can 
be subjected to approximately the same sorts of analyses appropriate to 
wider/non-EU international activity between nation states. [47]   However, 
and unlike Liberal Intergovernmentalism [48] and associated approaches, 
multilevel governance theory posits that these sorts of ideas cannot offer 
the most appropriate explanation of EU-specific action, interpreting the 
EU instead as a unique, novel entity. [49]   As such, it is maintained that 
the EU as a cumulative entity - to the extent that such an entity can even 
be identified - and the EU Member States within that entity, do not operate 
in a context that is analogous to wider extant international-level 
interactions, processes and arrangements amongst states [50] ; thus, it 
follows in turn that interpretations in the spirit of multilevel governance 
theory do not presuppose that EU climate and energy governance will 
conform usefully to analytical approaches traditionally applied to non-EU 
international relations.  In practice, therefore, it is unsurprising that 
multilevel governance theory does not interpret the 'supranational level' 
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as being in any way largely analogous to an 'international level'.  
 
Instead, and as Fairbrass and Jordan imply, the framework distinguishes 
a distinct type of international level that can be conceptualized as existing 
'above' the supranational level: 
 
the EU's environmental policies are typically the product of the 
competition and collaboration between state and non-state actors 
situated at the local, national, regional (i.e. European), and 
international levels. This complicated, contested, and evolving 
distribution of authority and competences is one of the most 
intriguing features of EU environmental governance. [51] 
 
It is submitted that the paradigm embodied by multilevel governance 
theory seems more appropriate to analyses of the EU climate and energy 
context than traditional state-centric readings, due most particularly to the 
EU's unique composition.  Thus, for instance, multilevel governance 
theorists have pointed out that the EU's circumstances imbue it with a 
particularly complex underlying governance framework that lies 
concealed within any superficial composite 'EU' identity that might be 
distinguished nominally, and that recognition of this circumstance must 
have analytical consequences: 
 
The argument put is that the EU neither resembles domestic polities 
nor international organizations, and therefore defies explanation 
from approaches applied either to politics within states or politics 
between states. [52] 
 
These theoretical insights will be returned to towards the end of this 
section in order to draw lessons from the consideration of major 
international-supranational level developments to follow.  Further, and 
reducing this line of thinking to its essentials, it is to be noted that the EU 
level's political-legal engagement with the wider international community 
at the international-supranational level interface can be usefully viewed as 
a two-tiered conversation wherein the EU agenda has both been shaped 
by, and has helped to shape, the development of international climate 
law.  A multilevel governance approach asserts that the UK has been 
subject to these profound forces in turn, but from its largely embedded 
position within the EU.  
 
The first major international-level instrument designed to redress climate 
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change was the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC), adopted by the UN in 1992. The UNFCCC 
crystallised in one legal framework an international desire to cooperate in 
combatting anthropogenic global warming, and Article 12 of the UNFCCC 
placed significant obligations upon the EU and its Member States to report 
on greenhouse gas reduction progress. In cohering common international 
intentions, the UNFCCC laid vital stepping-stones upon the path of 
international legislative cooperation; however, it is widely recognised that 
the UNFCCC was also troubled by several key weaknesses.  In particular, 
its lack of concrete action plans, specifically delineated commitments and 
tangible reduction targets meant that it could not achieve a great deal in 
practice. [53] 
 
In 1997 the Kyoto Protocol was set in place (in force February 2005). 
[54]   This international agreement committed developed nations listed in 
the UNFCCC's Annex I to binding greenhouse gas reduction targets of 'at 
least 5 per cent below 1990 levels in the commitment period 2008 to 
2012.' [55]   This valuable sense of practical progress was tempered, 
however, by the reluctance of certain nations to ratify the Protocol, which 
occurred despite the EU's intensive efforts to secure as many signatories 
as possible. Non-ratifying nations included the USA, China and India: with 
the exception of the EU itself, these nations largely constituted the key 
global greenhouse gas emitters.  The absence of these countries 
therefore undermined the Protocol's important achievements severely. In 
2002 the situation improved as both China and India signed up, although 
they did not receive binding reduction targets under the arrangement. The 
USA has remained as one of a small number of nations that has yet to 
ratify the Protocol. 
 
Under Kyoto the EU committed to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions 
by 8% from 1990 levels over the period 2008 - 2012. There are presently 
28 Member States in the EU, however this number has increased 
gradually over time and changes have been made to climate and energy 
policy in order to cater for the inclusion of new members, and to allow for 
differing circumstances across the diversity of the Member States. 
[56]   The EU takes a 'burden sharing' approach to its reduction 
commitments [57] whereby Member States' contributions are checked 
and balanced against their historic emissions levels and their capacity to 
meet what is deemed to be a fair proportion of the reductions.  The UK 
was bound to a 12.5% reduction over the 2008-2012 Kyoto period. 
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Annual greenhouse gas emission targets in Europe under the Kyoto Protocol (2008-2012) 
relative to base-year emissions. [58] 
 
The major international success embodied by the Kyoto Protocol was 
diluted somewhat by the understanding that its reduction targets were far 
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too low to mitigate the overall negative trajectory of global anthropogenic 
climate change.  Further, it has been noted above that certain nations 
including the USA could not be persuaded to ratify the agreement.  Nor 
did the Protocol map out detailed methods by which the international 
signatories were to proceed with the reductions drive after the closure of 
the initial 2008 - 2012 period.  Indeed, the negotiation of the next 
compliance phase was dragged out over subsequent years in a 
belaboured and recalcitrant fashion. [59]   Charnovitz has also pointed out 
that 'multilateral efforts to liberalize trade and to prevent global warming 
have proceeded largely on separate paths', arguing persuasively that 
marked progress is only likely to be made under a Kyoto-type framework 
when the imbalances between the spheres of trade and global warming 
prevention have been redressed. [60] 
 
3.4 PRESENT AND FUTURE INTERNATIONAL ACTION 
 
At the 2007 UN Climate Change Conference in Bali, Indonesia, the 
international community designed a 'Bali Road Map', [61] which was 
effectively a practical path intended to steer the UN towards further 
binding targets that, it was hoped, could be applied to nations at the UN's 
Copenhagen Conference 2009. [62] Ultimately agreement could not be 
reached at Copenhagen, and although a Copenhagen Accord was 
approved at the gathering, which expressly acknowledged a common 
desire to keep rising global temperatures to less than 2 degrees Celsius, 
[63] the nations could neither arrive at legally binding reduction targets nor 
set robust action plans in place expressing their way forward. Further 
conferences at Cancun and Durban did not remedy these shortcomings. 
[64] As EU-level representatives acting on the international stage on 
behalf of the EU had been a strong force in attempting to drive climate 
agreement forward at the international level in the wake of the initial Kyoto 
arrangements, the inability to reach agreement came as a significant 
frustration to senior EU diplomats. 
 
In December 2012 in Doha, Qatar, the 'Doha Amendment to the Kyoto 
Protocol' was agreed by the Kyoto signatories. [65]   Under the terms of 
this agreement the Kyoto parties set in place a second Kyoto commitment 
period, due to run from 1 January 2013 - 31 December 2020.  For this 
second period an 'overall commitment' to emissions cuts for the 
industrialised nations was agreed at 18% below 1990 baseline levels. 
[66]   The EU pledged a 20% reduction target based on 1990 levels for 
2020, which simply made reference to an ambitious 20-20-20 programme 
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that the EU had already put in place autonomously (see below). The 2013-
2020 compliance period was initially construed as a loose guide that the 
signatories intended to firm up over time: as such it is not directly 
comparable to the more robust 2008-2012 compliance period (hence, for 
instance, the gaping timespan between 2013 and 2020).  
 
In 2015 in Paris it was intended that the international community would 
further develop legally binding commitments to include robust nationally 
tailored reduction targets in the spirit of those delineated under the 2008-
2012 agreements.  After further significant delay due to an inability 
amongst the international community to agree on collective action, and 
with the EU positioning itself as a progressive Union endeavouring to drive 
the emissions reduction agreements forward, the Paris Agreement was 
cohered and agreed. [67]   While the final product arguably has not lived 
up to expectations, the Agreement does obligate signatories to prevent 
dangerous and irreversible levels of climate change, namely 
approximately 2 degrees Celsius or more of warming above pre-industrial 
levels, and it is intended that the Agreement will come actively into force 
in 2020 so that the present international framework will continue to roll on 
at the point when the 2013-2020 Doha Amendment timespan 
concludes.  It is also notable that the frequently recalcitrant USA has 
signed the Agreement (although American President Donald Trump has 
indicated that his administration will potentially reverse this in the near 
future), as have Japan, New Zealand and the Russian Federation, which 
did have binding commitments under the first Kyoto Protocol period but 
that had refused to adopt binding commitments for the second period. 
 
It will be useful to return directly now to the theoretical points concerning 
multilevel governance that were raised above. Given the very particular 
form of interrelationship that multilevel governance analysis recognizes 
between the EU, with its dense internal structure, and the wider 
international arena, it becomes apparent that the international level has 
contributed significantly in both direct and indirect ways to the structuring 
of the EU's climate law regime.  Subscription to the UNFCCC, the Kyoto 
Protocol, and so on, clearly embody 'direct' contributions to that process, 
but the degree of multi-level interconnection and vertical-hierarchical 
governance complexity ranging across and between the international and 
supranational levels suggests that numerous indirect / collateral / 
additional consequences are also manifest.  Many of these latter sorts of 
(indirect) consequences will be galvanised as an immediate result of the 
'direct' manifestations embodied by the UNFCC, etc.  These sorts of broad 
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ripple-effects across the multi-tiered waters of governance may be subtle, 
complex, or indeed scarcely perceptible. 
 
When viewed in the setting of multilevel governance theory, the 
developments addressed above serve to highlight the manner in which 
the EU plays a role as both a compound plurality of international actors - 
it is a collection of individualized Member States - and as an international 
actor in its own right, that is to say, the EU level is represented as a quasi-
monolithic tier of governance that can participate in an important way 
alongside nation states at what can be conceptualized as the 'international 
level'.  It is clear that the EU is a complex entity that is partially shaping 
international climate law and policy whilst it is also being shaped by its 
wider dealings with the international community and its attendant series 
of international-level agenda-setting relationships.  It is likely that the 
impact of this plural two-way channel will continue to suffuse downward 
throughout the EU multilevel nexus in both direct/indirect and overt/subtle 
ways; thus, it is likely in turn to continue to exert a roughly parallel range 
of transparent and (to some extent) non-transparent influences upon the 
national UK decarbonisation experience.  It follows, therefore, that when 
Brexit is completed, the UK will be beyond the direct purview of those 
influences. [68] 
 
Multilevel governance theory suggests that the sheer scale and scope of 
the multilevel disentanglement process and its attendant outcomes and 
consequences for the UK as it exits the EU are far too intricate, complex 
and wide-ranging to calculate in any remotely comprehensive or totalizing 
way, including in the discrete, challenging area of climate and energy 
governance. [69]   One can identify, highlight and consider consequences 
related to what have been characterized above as 'direct' impacts, but it 
is difficult to range far beyond these parameters with any concrete 
certainty.  One thing that is clear from the analysis above is that the UK to 
a significant extent participates in the UNFCCC from a nested position 
within the EU, and as such disconnecting the UK level from the EU level 
could similarly disconnect the UK from UNFCCC activity; however, it is to 
be noted that the UK is party to the UNFCCC both as an EU Member 
State and as a party in its own right.  It will therefore lose the augmented 
level of representation it receives through the EU, but will still have 
representation and direct association in its own right as soon as Brexit 
goes 'live'.  Similarly, in the case of the relatively recent Paris Agreement, 
the UK has joined as an individual signatory in spite of its quasi-nested 
position within the EU multilevel governance arena. [70]   In practical 
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terms, UK emissions reduction action is rolled into the EU's 'Intended 
Nationally Determined Contribution' (INDC) measures, [71] and so a 
consequence of Brexit is that the UK will be required to submit its own 
INDC calculations individually and directly (unless the EU and UK come 
to some special arrangement in this area).  
 
Analysis from the Grantham Institute [72] has determined that 'the 
departure of the UK will make it more difficult for the European Union to 
achieve the target contained in its INDC, for two main reasons', as follows: 
'First, the UK has been cutting its annual emissions of greenhouse gases 
at a faster rate than the average for the European Union'; 'Second, the UK 
is likely to have a significantly stronger-than-average national target' as 
part of the EU's 2030 emissions reduction drive. [73]   On the last point, it 
did transpire that the UK received a robust target for 2030 (set at a 57% 
reduction target on 1990 levels).  After some concern that Brexit would 
negate or dilute this reasonably substantial target, which, as clarified 
above, had largely filtered down the multilevels of governance to the UK 
via the EU level, the Guardian newspaper reported on Thursday 30 June 
2016 that 'The UK has announced an ambitious new carbon target for the 
early 2030s, allaying fears that the climate goal would be a casualty of the 
EU referendum.' [74]   In other words, UK Government took the decision 
to roll the 57% target into legally binding carbon budgeting levels at the 
national level under the terms of the CCA 2008. [75]   
 
In general terms, multilevel governance analysis throws into relief aspects 
of the significant extent to which the EU is both partially shaping and being 
shaped by international climate law and policy, with the UK being 
impacted by obvious and subtle complex forces that suffuse downward 
from this plural two-way channel to the national level.  When Brexit is 
completed, the UK will be beyond the immediate purview of these 
influences, and as such these circumstances might be a blessing or a 
curse: the UK will be freed up to act more robustly on the international 
stage in its own right, to enter unilaterally into various international 
agreements without requiring the moderating influence of the EU, [76] and 
so forth.  However, the primary obligation to take up this mantle will fall 
much more directly to the UK, and it remains to be seen whether key 
national actors will convert the opportunities that will accrue to the UK as 
a more 'independent' state within the wider international field into 
something more broadly positive or negative. 
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4. EU CLIMATE LAW AND POLICY 
 
As the EU was both being shaped by and was itself shaping the 
international political-legal governance vista that has been considered 
above, it was simultaneously developing its own internal climate and 
energy governance design.  It has been seen that a prolonged inability to 
reach wide-ranging international agreement on ambitious emission 
reduction targets left the EU's comparatively progressive approach to 
climate and energy governance relatively frustrated on the international 
stage.  Equivalent constraints did not exist within the EU's internal policy 
arena at the EU level of governance, and so the EU was here at greater 
liberty to press ahead with a more robust internal decarbonisation 
regime.  Thus, while the 2007 Bali Road Map was under construction the 
EU was engaged in what was effectively a two-tiered approach to 
decarbonisation: on one hand, EU actors continued to push for reduction 
commitments at the international level, and on the other hand the EU's 
institutions did not wait for agreement to be reached but instead pressed 
on internally with developing a governance regime tailored to the EU's 
perceived needs and interests.  These forces and their unfolding political-
legal consequences have duly exerted a fundamental shaping influence 
on climate and energy law and governance in a pre-Brexit UK. 
 
Successful energy decarbonisation pathways are predicated upon a 
particular series of assumptions, which, given the EU's present socio-
economic context and speaking broadly, need to be adequately reflected 
in any current supranational decarbonisation regime if that regime is to be 
successful in practice.  These features include enhanced energy 
efficiency measures and associated strategic reductions in end-use 
energy consumption, where a focus falls on driving down general energy 
demand levels. [77]   They also include a transition away from finite 
energy sources toward renewable sources of energy.  Renewables have 
the dual benefit of facilitating a reduction in emissions levels whilst 
sustainably replacing highly pollutant forms of energy generation at 
source. [78]   A successful multilevel EU-UK decarbonisation transition, 
then, will require successful energy decarbonisation, and this in turn must 
be predicated upon a transition away from greenhouse gas-emitting fossil 
fuels. [79]   The EU has endeavoured to directly reflect these sorts of 
understandings in a strategically designed 2020 climate and energy 
programme (the '20-20-20 programme'), and this framework is being 
developed in turn towards 2030 and beyond.  Prior to considering this 
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programme directly, it will be useful to set it against the backdrop of the 
changing landscape of EU treaty law, which has facilitated the 
programme's creation, development and pervasive influence across the 
multilevel EU-UK climate and energy governance regime. 
 
4.1 SUPRANATIONAL TREATY DEVELOPMENTS 
 
The 20-20-20 programme itself would not have been possible if certain 
key Treaty reforms that have lately occurred had not taken place, due to 
the fact that recent major energy-specific treaty revisions largely form the 
technical legal basis of the supranational institutions' facility to act in this 
area.  It is well known that the EU's constitutional arrangements are 
founded upon two major treaties, the Treaty on European Union (TEU) 
and what was originally the Treaty establishing the European 
Community.  Both treaties were amended by the Treaty of Lisbon, which 
entered into force on 1 December 2009, and as part of this reforming 
process the latter treaty was renamed the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU). [80]   Lisbon attempted to contribute to the 
adjustment of the broadly unharmonised landscape of Member State 
energy policy so that a greater degree of energy coherence could be 
realised across the Union.  Arriving in the wake of the UN's Copenhagen 
Conference, these reforms partially served to emphasise an EU-level 
refusal to be deterred by a perceived international failure to achieve 
significant progress on climate change.  The Lisbon changes designated 
energy for the first time in the history of the EU as an area of '[s]hared 
competence between the Union and the Member States'. [81] 
 
Lisbon also inserted the following into the section of the TFEU dealing 
with 'Economic Policy' [82] : 
 
Without prejudice to any other procedures provided for in the 
Treaties, the Council, on a proposal from the Commission, may 
decide, in a spirit of solidarity between Member States, upon the 
measures appropriate to the economic situation, in particular if 
severe difficulties arise in the supply of certain products, notably in 
the area of energy. [83] 
 
Here the concern of energy security that has been discussed above is 
clearly manifest, and the revision to the law now casts the issue as an 
explicit EU-level problem, as opposed to a problem specifically nested at 
the level of governance moderated directly by the individual Member 
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States.  These revisions also make it explicit that adequate energy supply 
underpins a healthy EU economy.  The TFEU's Title XX, concerning 
'Environment' (formerly Title XIX), also received the following insertion 
into its list of environmental objectives at Art.191: 
 
- promoting measures at international level to deal with regional or 
worldwide environmental problems, and in particular combating 
climate change. [84] 
 
This insertion clearly embeds the EU institutions' supranational 
commitment to climate change mitigation and adaptation as a Treaty-
based legal imperative.  It is notable that the new reference has cemented 
the EU's commitment to promoting effective climate governance at the 
'international level'. 
 
Most importantly, the Lisbon Treaty also embedded Title XXI in the 
TFEU.  This Title deals expressly with Energy.  Title XXI Art.194(1) states 
as follows: 
 
In the context of the establishment and functioning of the internal 
market and with regard for the need to preserve and improve the 
environment, Union policy on energy shall aim, in a spirit of solidarity 
between Member States, to: 
 
a) ensure the functioning of the energy market; 
 
b) ensure security of energy supply in the Union; 
 
c) promote energy efficiency and energy saving and the 
development of new and renewable forms of energy; and 
 
d) promote the interconnection of energy networks. [85] 
 
In placing the EU energy sector within the 'context' of the 'establishment 
and functioning of the internal market', [86] and in prioritising the 
'functioning of the energy market', [87] one witnesses EU treaty law's 
partial supranational-level subsumation of key aspects of the energy 
sector ('energy market') within the wider EU economy ('internal 
market').  The textual approach to energy in the law here suggests that 
the EU institutions recognize an inextricable connection between energy 
security and supranational economic wellbeing.  It also cements the 
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general objectives of the 20-20-20 programme (see further below) [88] 
and asserts that a healthy EU energy sector must no longer consist of a 
disparate Member State patchwork, but rather must transition towards the 
'interconnection of… networks'. [89]   
 
The EU's efforts to cohere its internal energy market are an essential 
element of its current pan-EU Member State market integration 
strategy.  A central strategy objective is predicated upon the facilitation of 
cross-border Member State electricity exchange, and it is hoped that gas 
and electricity will flow reasonably freely and fluidly within the EU by the 
time that the 2020 milestone date has arrived.  This agenda is being 
driven by the 'Third Energy Package', expressed most prominently in EU 
law by the Electricity Directive [90] and the Natural Gas Directive, [91] and 
further supported by a series of key Regulations. [92]   All these elements 
are key components of what the EU describes as its overall intention to 
deliver an EU 'Energy Union', where energy can flow freely, securely, 
sustainably and affordably across the Member States. [93] 
 
These are initiatives led chiefly at the EU level of governance, and they 
embody developments that are substantial enough to impact significantly 
the behavior and relationships of key public and private actors ranging 
vertically and horizontally across the EU-UK governance levels, while also 
impacting radically the extensive multilevel energy policy networks that 
underpin governance in this area.  Although the totalizing impacts of Brexit 
in this setting remain unclear, [94] a multilevel governance approach to 
analysis forces the conclusion that, at the very least, Brexit will serve to 
place the UK level beyond the immediate purview of both a range of 
significant EU-level capacities for legislative action in the sphere of energy 
(and indeed the laws that flow from those capacities), and a general 
supranational policy trajectory (towards greater energy 
interconnection).  Further, it also suggests that this will occur in a manner 
that could serve to hinder any post-Brexit drive on the part of the UK to 
significantly augment energy co-operation and general energy 
interconnection with immediate neighbours.  This is the case insofar as 
most UK neighbours are EU Member States and as such they themselves 
are subject to the range of primary governance drivers discussed above, 
which, it has been seen, are partially received by EU Member States from 
'above' at the supranational level of governance. [95] 
 
However, analysis of the law in this area also reveals that these insights 
must be qualified significantly.  Section 2 of Article 194 TFEU states that, 
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in adopting the measures necessary to achieve the objectives in TFEU 
Art.194(1), these measures must not: 
 
affect a Member State's right to determine the conditions for 
exploiting its energy resources, its choice between different energy 
sources and the general structure of its energy supply[.] [96] 
 
In clarifying that Member States retain the freedom to 'exploit' their own 
energy resources largely on their own terms here, EU Treaty law has 
imbued UK Government (and the other Member State governments) with 
significant room to manoeuvre. It has also left the UK governance level 
free to 'structure' its energy supply as it sees fit, and granted it the 'choice' 
between different energy sources. [97]   This type of section exemplifies 
the fact that there are significant checks on aspects of supranational-level 
energy control, orienting much power and authority in the direction of the 
national governance level.  This is scarcely surprising given the state-
centric approach that UK Government and other individual Member State 
governments have traditionally adopted to energy governance, offering up 
elements of internal energy competence to the supranational institutions 
with a notable sense of reluctance.  Thus, Lisbon's insertion of Article 
192(2)(c) into the TFEU protectively states that 'measures significantly 
affecting a Member State's choice between different energy sources and 
the general structure of its energy supply' can only be enacted by the 
Council in instances where the Council acts unanimously. [98] 
 
Nonetheless, taken cumulatively, these treaty law developments illustrate 
how the UK's energy sector has been progressively woven into a wider, 
more broadly interconnected transnational environment both 'legally' (in 
terms of shared competence under treaty law) and 'actually' (in terms of 
practical interconnection).  Multilevel governance theory suggests that 
key UK-level governance actors and indeed major energy-specific policy 
networks will be required to carefully manage the implications of these 
aspects of UK-EU multilevel relations as the UK disentangles itself from 
the EU and moves towards a post-Brexit world.  This complicated process 
must be conducted carefully: where the UK level snaps itself off from the 
EU level and its attendant frameworks carelessly or recklessly, gaping 
policy gaps must open up in relation to the issues raised above at the UK 
level, and associated legal gaps and inconsistencies must also appear. 
[99]  Further, if due care is not taken the UK will in effect be thrust from 
the relative stability of a condition of energy systems integration (within 
the EU) into a condition of comparative energy systems dis-integration (as 
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a consequence of falling suddenly outside the purview of the EU's 
unfolding energy market and governance integration trajectory). 
 
4.2 THE 20-20-20 CLIMATE AND ENERGY PACKAGE 
 
At the period in which the international community was struggling to 
cohere the 2007 Bali Road Map, the EU released its 20-20-20 
programme.  Here the European Council announced that the EU intended 
to make a political commitment to: the reduction of its greenhouse gas 
emission levels by 20% below a 1990 measurement baseline; the 
improvement of its efficiency performance by 20%; and the increase of 
renewable energy levels in its energy mix by 20%. [100]   These targets 
were to be achieved by the year 2020.  Given the nature of the Brexit 
process, it seems likely at the time of writing that the UK will formally exit 
the EU in or around late March 2019 (due to the two-year Article 50 
withdrawal timespan discussed above), meaning that the UK appears to 
be on a course that renders it directly subject to the EU 20-20-20 
framework up to a point that is relatively close to the stage at which the 
final targets apply (i.e., the commencement of 2020). [101]   
 
EU legislation appeared in 2009 to translate the objectives into binding 
legal obligations.  The supranational legislative framework has been built 
on a revised Emissions Trading Scheme Directive designed to support the 
stated 2020 goals. [102]   This requires carbon emissions to be cut from 
regulated industry by 21% from a 2005 baseline level by 2020, and areas 
outside of the scheme's remit (transport, housing, etc.) are caught by an 
Effort Sharing Decision that requires the UK to reduce emissions by 16% 
from 2005 baselines by 2020. [103] A Carbon Capture and Storage 
Directive was also issued in order to facilitate investment in Carbon 
Capture and Storage (CCS) technology and its deployment. [104]   The 
law on renewables was established by the Renewables Directive 
2009/28/EC, [105] with an obligation to achieve a total EU renewable 
energy share of 20% by 2020 asserted at Article 3. [106]   The Directive 
further asserts that this is to be done through a varied set of target 
percentages tailored to each individual EU state. [107] In the UK's case, 
the Directive has committed the state to lifting its renewables share from 
1.3% (measured at a 2005 baseline) to 15% by 2020. [108]   
 
While these targets are acting on the UK at present, EU-level targets will 
cease to apply once Brexit is fulfilled.  It is probable (though not absolutely 
certain) that the UK will cement these requirements in national law at the 
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point in which it leaves the EU. [109]   Assuming that this does take place, 
it is notable that the force of primary requirements will then emanate from 
the national level and as such the legal circumstances will be much 
different: for example, the EU-level European Commission will not act in 
a direct oversight role, the UK cannot be brought before the CJEU for 
breach of legal requirements, and so on. [110]   Further, requirements can 
be conventionally repealed by UK Parliament.  Indeed, after being 
'grandfathered' into UK law under the terms of the European Union 
(Withdrawal) Bill 2017-2019, EU law will then be under a prolonged 
condition of review, with a view to much EU-derived law being pruned 
out/repealed/altered by UK Government under proposed delegated 
powers [111] and by UK Parliament through conventional parliamentary 
legislation.  
 
The 20-20-20 programme paints the EU institutions in an inspirational light 
on the international stage, however it also brings with it a pressure to 
deliver on the 2020 targets.  Multilevel governance analysis highlights that 
this pressure continues to be borne at the time of writing by a pre-Brexit 
UK (and the other Member States) from its nested national-level 
positioning below the supranational level of governance, and most 
particularly by the energy sector.  Within the UK, this sustained process 
of horizontal and vertical multilevel pressure has driven progressive 
decarbonisation; in exiting the EU, this supranational pressure will cease 
to operate directly on the UK level, and thus there is a significant 
possibility that this could serve to negatively impact decarbonisation law 
and practice within the state. 
 
4.3 2020: CHALLENGES 
 
Neither the international community as a whole nor the EU in isolation are 
doing nearly enough to suppress greenhouse gas emissions to an extent 
that will allow humanity to adequately contain the damaging effects of 
anthropogenic climate change that are anticipated by scientists to 
intensify over the remainder of this century. [112]   Nonetheless, where 
the EU level's climate and energy decarbonisation framework is situated 
in the context of wider global developments, it is clear that it is relatively 
progressive. [113]   It is also notable, however, that the 2020 legislative 
framework has displayed arguable design flaws: in terms of 'hard law', the 
supranational legislation enacted to support the 2020 vision deals directly 
and in a fairly sophisticated way with renewables (Renewables Directive), 
[114] emissions trading (ETS Directive), [115] non-ETS sectors (Effort 
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Sharing Decision), [116] and CCS (CCS Directive) [117] ; however an 
equivalent legal instrument was not produced to target the vital area of 
energy efficiency in a comparably coherent manner after these other 
aspects of the 20-20-20 programme had been drawn together in the 
legislation.  
 
This ultimately occurred with the arrival in 2012 of Directive 2012/27/EU, 
the 'Energy Efficiency Directive'. [118]  Prior to this, binding law at the 
supranational level continued to rely on instruments including the Energy 
Performance of Buildings Directive, [119] a follow-up buildings Directive 
enacted in 2010, [120] the 2006 Energy End-Use Efficiency and Energy 
Services Directive, [121] and certain other legal measures. [122]   It soon 
became clear that the initial approach adopted at the supranational level 
would not do, a European Commission Impact Assessment determining 
in 2011 that: 
 
the EU is not on track to fully realise… energy savings.  Whilst the 
latest business-as-usual scenario shows a break in the trend 
towards ever increasing energy demand, the reduction in the 
consumption will be only about 9% in 2020.  Therefore, if the EU 
does not double the efforts, it will not reach its 20% [energy 
efficiency] target[.] [123] 
 
The 2012 Energy Efficiency Directive has been crafted as a means of 
contributing to the shoring up of the significant gap that has existed within 
the 20-20-20 legislative framework in this area. [124]   The Directive 
embodied a positive step in a legislative sense, and it has served to help 
the EU perform more strongly [125] ; energy efficiency's  notoriously 
nebulous and low-visibility nature can render it a particularly difficult area 
to treat effectively. As the EU-level has undergone a steady evolution of 
its climate law and policy, with the major supranational governance 
institutions engaging in the outworking of hard problems and 
complications over the course of the process, the UK, as one of the EU's 
Member States, has benefitted from the improvements that have accrued 
and been applied 'downward' to the national level over the course of this 
development.  Thus, in exiting the EU, multilevel governance analysis 
highlights that the UK will be compelled to address its own emergent 
problems in a more individual and isolated setting, which could pose 
enhanced challenges in its own right. 
 
A further example of significant criticism pertains to the 2020 Renewables 
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Directive targets. [126]   The overall 20% target figure was widely criticised 
as being too low over the course of the development of the legislation.  A 
drive to raise the target appeared to be in the ascendancy during the 
negotiation phase, however certain states resisted the 
momentum.  Poland in particular was recalcitrant across much of the 
negotiating process, with Germany and Italy amongst other states also 
exhibiting prominent reserve. [127]   As a consequence, by the end of the 
process the renewables targets were significantly lower than they might 
have been.  Brexit means that key governance actors at the UK level will 
no longer be subject to these sorts of EU-specific breaks on progressive 
climate policy and associated mitigating influences, such that the UK will 
enjoy opportunities to forge ahead in progressive ways with less active 
constraint.  
 
However, signals on the ground from UK Government at the present time 
suggest that the UK may not be ready or willing to take such 
opportunities.  For example, it is notable that UK Government suddenly 
abolished its CCS Competition - where £1 billion had been ring-fenced to 
support CCS development in the UK - 6 months before the competition 
fund was due to be awarded, and in breach of the governing Conservative 
party's manifesto. [128]  Not long after this, UK Prime Minister Theresa 
May took over office from former Prime Minister David Cameron.  Former 
Scottish Climate Change Minister Stewart Stevenson has pointed out that 
'one of the first major policy actions of the new UK Prime Minister has 
been to abolish her climate change department', that is, the Department 
of Energy and Climate Change, which was promptly closed by her new 
administration. [129]   Shortly prior to Prime Minister May's appointment 
to office (July 2016), her party applied significant cuts to financial supports 
for wind and solar renewable technologies, which her administration has 
since sustained and driven forward. [130]   These sorts of developments 
suggest that the UK level may be restrained by UK Government and 
associated powerful national governance actors from realising potentially 
very fulsome opportunities for enhanced or more radical progressive 
action in the sphere of climate and energy governance, which will arise as 
a consequence of the wedge that Brexit will drive between EU-level and 
UK-level governance regimes. 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
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A multilevel governance approach to analysis facilitates a clearer 
understanding of the interaction between the EU and UK with reference 
to climate and energy law and policy by exposing and clarifying the 
manner in which the EU's 20-20-20 programme and its associated 
evolution towards 2030 and onwards has permitted supranational climate 
and energy governance to drive EU-UK/Member State relations in this 
area to a previously unknown historical moment.  In effect, the EU-level 
longterm, legally binding supranational decarbonisation framework 
compels the UK and other Member States to operate an extensive 
decarbonisation agenda that divests the national governments and 
associated key national-level actors of a significant degree of energy 
autonomy.  These features, working in conjunction with the EU's 'Energy 
Union' drive, are unprecedented in an evolving EU hitherto dominated by 
a broad spectrum of national governments that have collectively guarded 
their autonomous energy controls at the national level of governance in a 
relatively unyielding manner.  In actively drawing practical elements of 
Member State energy competence 'upward' in the multilevel governance 
nexus from the national level to the supranational level in the aftermath of 
the Lisbon Treaty's broader EU/Member State energy competence 
adjustments, the 2020 framework has seen to it that UK energy 
decarbonisation and associated governance is no longer a primarily 
'national-level' affair, but also a substantively supranational matter. 
 
A more 'state-centric' interpretation of these multilevel EU-UK 
circumstances could quite reasonably have formed a point of departure 
where this sort of inquiry was being conducted in the lead up to the 
enactment of the UK's CCA 2008, or even at the time of its 
commencement, that is, at a time prior to certain key reforms to EU treaty 
law (2009), the articulation of the 20-20-20 programme's legal framework 
(also 2009), and so on.  However, analysis of the developments that have 
been thrown into relief above through the lens of multilevel governance 
theory clarifies that decarbonisation of energy within Member States is 
now partially and significantly driven by supranational forces, which over 
the period 2007-2009 have supplanted key aspects of the national-level 
controls that had hitherto imbued UK Government with a robust facility to 
control this matter internally.  As such, where the UK absents itself from 
the EU it must also disentangle its climate and energy regime from a 
complex set of shared arrangements; and further, it needs to ensure that 
suitable national level political-legal action is undertaken in order to fill 
aspects of a resultant governance void.  While it appears that part of this 
task will be attended to by UK Government's European Union 
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(Withdrawal) Bill 2017-2019, there are also broader challenges in this 
line.  For example, in terms of the UK's options post-Brexit, it has been 
highlighted above that Brexit will potentially thrust the UK from a condition 
of energy systems integration inside of the EU to a condition of 
comparative energy systems dis-integration, in that the UK will find itself 
outside of the EU's unfolding energy market integration programme and 
associated processes. 
 
In-depth multilevel governance analysis of the EU provided by scholars 
including Bulmer, [131] Hooghe, [132] Jachtenfuchs, [133] Marks [134] 
and Blank [135] has long since helped to expose various qualities inherent 
in the EU's governance arrangements that are collectively unique to the 
EU itself.  Crucially, it is clear that the supranational level exhibits an ability 
to imbue its key supranational actors with a degree of autonomy that 
extends over time and that is not necessarily contingent upon Member 
State permissiveness; this is due in no small part to an express degree of 
interaction between supranational institutional design and long-term 
supranational legal frameworks.  A range of EU integration analysts have 
reasoned convincingly that institutional choices made in the past have the 
capacity to become substantially 'locked in' so that they continue to act 
upon policy outcomes over time. [136]   Path dependence is typically 
augmented by the manner in which actors within institutional structures 
tend to lean towards perpetuating policy choices that harmonise with the 
policy trajectory of the institution in which they are enmeshed. [137]   This 
aspect of institutional path dependence can feed directly into wider 
national processes, as emphasised by Levi: 
 
once a country or region has started down a path, the costs of 
reversal are very high.  There will be other choice points, but the 
entrenchments of certain institutional arrangements obstruct easy 
reversal of the initial choice. [138]   
 
Drawing together the EU/UK analysis undertaken in this study in light of 
multilevel governance ideas, it is apparent that an extensive, long term 
and (crucially) legally binding climate and energy framework has 
cemented vital EU objectives in place at the supranational level, even 
though the practical work towards those objectives occurs primarily at 
national levels. [139]   Where a Member State like the UK is considered 
in the context of its embedded position within the EU, although it is far 
from impossible for the UK and the other Member States to dismantle this 
framework, any substantial demolition would be an enormous task. 
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Certainly, the UK could not undo it by itself; it would require the wide-
ranging support of EU Member States to affect the change.  However, in 
withdrawing from the EU the UK is no longer subject to such 
constraints.  In a post-Brexit world UK Government and national 
Parliament have much more freedom to retain only partial aspects of the 
supranational framework after it has been grandfathered into UK law 
under the intended European Union (Withdrawal) Bill process, [140] 
perhaps cherry-picking elements that seem most suitable to government 
intentions.  Even if the fulsome climate and energy framework is 
transposed and retained as definitively as possible [141] over time in 
some nationally equivalent form (which is highly unlikely), it is more readily 
susceptible to repeal by national Parliament at some point nonetheless, 
and the 'locked in' and path dependent features identified above can no 
longer apply to an equivalent degree.  
 
These Brexit developments clearly set the UK's decarbonisation regime 
on shakier foundations: in absenting itself from the EU, then, the very 
fabric of the UK's national governance framework in this highly important 
area is profoundly threatened.  It is also clear, however, that the 20-20-20 
programme is not without its problems, as where renewables targets 
might have been more robust, energy efficiency might have been 
addressed in the legislation more effectively and coherently, 
etc.  Whereas the framework's beneficial decarbonisation drivers have 
been transmitted 'downward' in the multilevel governance nexus to the UK 
level, so too have its problematic features.  Here then is one clear benefit 
accruing to the UK as a consequence of Brexit, insofar as the UK can now 
divorce itself from these sorts of problematic features; however, 
substantial signals from UK Government that this potential gain will be 
converted into progressive political-legal action may be lacking. [142]  In 
going forward, a post-Brexit UK, at least in the area of climate and energy 
governance, will be in no small part what the UK itself makes of it. 
 
'In the middle of difficulty lies opportunity' 
 
Albert Einstein 
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